I give you a hidden nugget, which was buried deeply on the net and is gone by now, until you are using The Internet Archive.
It is an interview about the Russian war done by
Pjotr Skorobogaty, who talked to
Ruslan Pukhov, who is the director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies in Russia. Which is basically a Russian military think tank.
The interview was done in Russian, and on an Russian web site - but removed shortly after. So now you can only get it using this link:
Пётр Скоробогатый побеседовал с Русланом Пуховым о трудностях российских вооруженных сил на украинском фронте.
web.archive.org
Well, and the analysis which Pukvov gave is quite open, and doesn't shed a good light on the Russian army. Which is probably the reason why the inverview was pulled of the web, because he gives a no nonsense and especially not a propaganda plagued view.
For example he states that...
* Russia mainly uses quite old weapon systems
* Russian tanks have no active protection complex right now, which is a shame since this was first invented in the Soviet Union, and a tank without KAZ will not survive the battlefield
* Ukrainian gunners are more experienced than Russian ones
* "To put it bluntly - we don't have air superiority."
About howitzers:
- The fact is that the Soviet weapons, which are now used by both Russia and Ukraine, be it howitzers or multiple rocket launchers, with a few exceptions, they hit no further than 20-25 km. Moreover, we have a lot of 122-mm howitzers, which generally fire only 13 km. Modern Western artillery is long-range - first of all, we are talking about 155-mm howitzers with a barrel length of 39 calibers, and especially 52 calibers - the latter have a range of up to 40-41 km. The problem of lagging behind the USSR and Russia in the range of artillery fire has been obvious since the eighties, alas. True, now Western equipment is at the disposal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine so far in homeopathic doses, but supplies are growing. Accordingly, during an artillery duel, Ukrainian systems will be able to destroy our batteries, and return fire simply will not reach the target. Finally, this issue is becoming particularly acute in connection with the commenced deliveries of HIMARS and MLRS missile systems to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which fire high-precision GPS-guided GMLRS missiles with a range of up to 85 km.
About end of summer:
But the Ukrainians learn very quickly, they turned out to be quite talented warriors. Training takes several weeks, so in fact the supply of weapons is on the rise, including in terms of quality (the same HIMARS). By the end of summer, I think the situation on the fronts can become dramatic. In addition, we do not have mobilization; in fact, we are fighting with a peacetime army. And they already have the fourth wave of mobilization, so there is no shortage of people. Yes, the regular army has been largely eliminated in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but there is the first reserve, which was driven through the ATO. There are second and third tiers. That is, at some point, a positional deadlock may occur, as in the Korean War since 1951, and our army will simply stand up and will not be able to move further. Let's not hit them with nuclear weapons.
Also: some who thinks that Pukhov has no clue what he's talking about in some areas.
One of our friends, understandably, asked the question about this: We publish an excellent interview with Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Ce...
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