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Novel attack against virtually all VPN apps neuters their entire purpose
TunnelVision vulnerability has existed since 2002 and may already be known to attackers.
arstechnica.com
Basically they're able to use a DHCP server setting to quietly re-direct local traffic before it even gets to the VPN client, shunting the data into an unencrypted route where it can be read and manipulated by the attacker. The VPN itself stays connected though, so it continues to believe everything is normal and doesn't give any alerts or trip its kill-switch.Our technique is to run a DHCP server on the same network as a targeted VPN user and to also set our DHCP configuration to use itself as a gateway. When the traffic hits our gateway, we use traffic forwarding rules on the DHCP server to pass traffic through to a legitimate gateway while we snoop on it.
We use DHCP option 121 to set a route on the VPN user’s routing table. The route we set is arbitrary and we can also set multiple routes if needed. By pushing routes that are more specific than a /0 CIDR range that most VPNs use, we can make routing rules that have a higher priority than the routes for the virtual interface the VPN creates. We can set multiple /1 routes to recreate the 0.0.0.0/0 all traffic rule set by most VPNs.
This is seriously bad, and one of the worst things about it, to me, is that the language in the article suggests that it's a vulnerability that can't be fixed.




